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The latter half of the 1990s saw much of French political debate focusing on a series of issues 
arising from the development  and implementation of the PACS (Pacte civil  de solidarité) 
legislation. Opponents and proponents clashed over questions related to the potential impact 
the  PACS was perceived  as  having on family structures,  filiation,  and citizenship of  the 
contemporary  métropole.  It  is  through  such  questions  that  discussions  of  the  legislation 
evolved into an engagement with the values of late 20th century republicanism, and, through 
the work of such authors as Martel, Fassin, and Foerster, as will be argued here, the PACS 
debates ultimately mapped out a way forward for the postqueer citizen and a renegotiation of 
French republicanism.
In 1996, Frédéric Martel published Le Rose et le noir, a comprehensive history of gays and 
lesbians  in  France  covering  the  period  from 1968  to  the  year  of  publication.  A  crucial 
resource  for  those  working  in  gay  and  lesbian  studies,  Martel  also  offered,  in  the  1996 
epilogue to his  work,  a critical  engagement  with the traditional  republican framework by 
which it was informed, setting forth a position opposed to the imposition of an American-
style community-based model of society. Martel’s own view of the situation changed between 
1996 and the subsequent re-edition of the book in 2000, a year after the implementation of the 
PACS legislation, and he has accordingly rewritten the final stages, including the epilogue 
discussed  here.  Despite  this  post-PACS  rewrite,  the  arguments  put  forward  in  the  first 
publication  remain  relevant  insofar  as  they  encapsulate  a  pro  republicanism  stance  still 
adopted by many in the French political arena, particularly in relation to issues related to 
sexuality, sexual citizenship, and gender:
Pour parvenir à une meilleure intégration des minorités et des populations vulnérables et pour 
lutter  plus  efficacement  contre  l’exclusion,  nos  démocraties  modernes  connaissent  une 
tentation communautaire. (Martel 1996 : 398)
Martel maintains that this ‘tentation communautaire’ should be viewed not as a positive end 
goal to be achieved by the particular minority groupings concerned, but rather as a stepping 
stone towards a more productive model of broader societal identity construction. His position, 
as  expressed  here,  can  thus  be  read  as  resolutely  pro-republican  in  a  traditional,  anti-
communitarian stance, arguing against the recognition of cultural difference on an individual 
or collective level.
In part,  Martel’s concern stems from his contention that ‘la logique communautaire mène 
quasi nécessairement à la logique identitaire’ (Martel 1996: 403), which he views, in turn, as 
being at odds with the founding principles of French republicanism. While Martel is eager for 
those who feel the need for such a movement to have the freedom to fight for it, he also seems 
keen to ensure that the ambiguities of such struggles be foregrounded:
Si je reste persuadé que ceux qui ressentent la nécessité d’un mouvement identitaire doivent se 
battre pour cela, comment se dispenser de souligner les limites de ce combat et ses ambiguïtés. 
(Martel 1996: 403)
He is particularly keen to avoid what he views as an attempt to transfer the American model 
onto the French Republic, and his criticism of this model is scathing. He argues that, had the 
1970s gay movement and, later, AIDS activists in France acted differently, there may well 
have been ‘une victoire  française  d’assimilation  (la  société  intègre  les  individus  mais  ne 
reconnaît pas les groupes) sur le modèle américain communautaire’ (Martel 1996: 404). The 
value judgement inherent in Martel’s description is clear from his subsequent remark to the 
effect  that  America  is  a  ‘société  qui  cultive  sa  propre  fragmentation au  bénéfice  de 
communautés juxtaposées’ (Martel 1996: 406 [my emphasis]). Rather than viewing the notion 
of  fragmentation  negatively,  this  article  will  ask  whether  the  ‘fragmentation’  at  issue 
necessarily leads to breakdown, or can, if brought into dialogue with the work of figures such 
as Eric Fassin and Maxime Foerster, be read as a sign of positive and constructive transition.
Dialogue, Mediation, Negotiation
Paradoxically, it is this notion of fragmentation and the possibility of positive, constructive 
transition that points towards contemporary evolutions in the status of the postqueer citoyen. 
However clear Martel is that his own preference does not lie with an American model  of 
society  structured  around  minority  communities,  his  1996  epilogue  offers  a  constructive 
approach to the topic. Martel equates community with ghetto, suggesting, for example, that 
what  may  be  regarded  by  some  as  the  positive  process  of  ‘coming  out’,  is  in  fact  an 
expression of Foucauldian power relations forcing the individual into processes of confession, 
thus placing the individual in the position of dominated, rather than dominating (Martel 1996: 
399). However, he is also clear that this is not a necessary component of the model but rather 
stems,  at  least  in  part,  from the  tendency on  the  part  of  the  individual  members  of  the 
minority  groupings  concerned  to  opt  for  either  a  ‘communautarisme  défensif’  or  a 
‘communautarisme offensif’ (Martel 1996: 403). Neither path lends itself to integration or 
assimilation within broader society (Martel 1996: 399). Rather both options, in Martel’s view, 
highlight difference to the exclusion of the norm, i.e. difference as particularism demanding 
recognition, whereas others argue for equality through difference and an expansion of the 
terms of traditional French republicanism to encompass this notion. 
He is, however, open to the suggestion that dialogue between communities may, in some way, 
offer a solution to the problem, and equally keen to underline that universality and identity do 
not benefit from being opposed in too sweeping or simplistic a manner:
[L]a plupart des individus se situent néanmoins sur des positions qui sont des combinaisons de 
particulier et de l’universel […]. En outre, il est certainement possible d’envisager une position 
intermédiaire,  restant  précisément  à  définir  –  sinon  à  inventer  –,  qui  combinerait 
multiculturalisme avec défense de l’Etat républicain. (Martel 1996 : 404)
This article argues that such combinations are, in fact, viable in a contemporary context and 
that it is precisely this ‘position intermédiaire’ which can be seen as being occupied by the 
postqueer citizens of contemporary metropolitan France.
Political debate in the years following publication of the first edition of  Le Rose et le noir 
came to revolve around issues related to the PACS. These issues, in turn, intersected with a 
series of broader gender and family-oriented debates, all of which centred on the key notion 
of ‘filiation’. This concept, according to Fassin, became the ‘cornerstone’ (Fassin 2001: 225) 
of rhetoric in public discourses on the PACS and in the wider debate it provoked regarding 
the evolution of family structures in France, due to a perception that ‘[f]iliation structures the 
human psyche (as a symbolic link between parent and child) and at the same time culture 
itself (as consanguinity complements affinity)’ (Fassin 2001: 225).
Ample illustration of the centrality of this notion can be found, for instance, in the evidence 
presented  in  Gélard’s  1999  report  to  the  Sénat’s  Commission  des  lois.  The  Commission 
expressed its opposition to the establishment of the PACS on a number of grounds, not least 
because of what it termed the:
dangers que représente ce statut pour le mariage et l’union libre ainsi que des risques qu’il 
comporte en matière de filiation du fait qu’il s’adresse indifféremment à des couples qui ont 
vocation à procréer et à d’autres qui ne le peuvent pas. (Gélard, 1999)
This conclusion was reached, in part,  thanks to evidence presented to the  Commission by 
Irène Théry who was perhaps the most vocal opponent of the legislation. Théry frequently 
turned to the notion of an ‘ordre symbolique’ − and the duty (as she saw it) of French law to 
uphold this order − in her public arguments against the proposed legislation. She did so not 
least  because,  in  her  view,  ‘filiation  without  sexual  difference  would  [...]  undermine  a 
symbolic order that is the very condition of our ability to think and live in society’ (Théry in 
Fassin 2001:  229 [In English in  original  article]).  In Théry’s  view heterosexual  marriage 
within the French Republic should be considered as ‘l’institution qui lie la différence des 
sexes à la différence des générations.’ She maintained that ‘la famille doit rester le lieu de la 
“ différence  symbolique”  des  sexes’  and  that  ‘il  pourrait  être  dangereux  de  nier  les 
conséquences sur la filiation de la différence biologique des parents’ (cited in Gélard, 1999).
Just as opponents of what was to become the PACS had recourse to the concept of filiation, 
so too did proponents of the legislation frame their endorsement in similar terms:
[Le  PACS]  ne  modifie  ni  les  règles  en  matière  de  filiation  et  d’adoption,  ni  les  règles 
concernant  la  procréation  médicalement  assistée  ou  l’autorité  parentale.  S’agissant  de  la 
filiation, le Pacs n’a aucun effet. (Martel, 2001)
Similarly, Elisabeth Guigou, then Minister of Justice, made clear that:
The Pacte does not concern the family. Accordingly, how could it possibly have an effect upon 
the rules of filiation? (cited in Stychin, 2001: 361)
Clearly, such concerns can be understood within longer-term developments of French society 
in which ‘toute l’histoire de la famille, depuis 1945, se résume […] à un inexorable déclin de 
la ‘puissance paternelle’ (Fize 1998: 20). However, the significance of links draw between 
filiation and national  identity,  between family and nation,  becomes  increasingly pertinent 
when considered alongside,  firstly,  the rise in support  for  the Front National  – up to and 
including Le Pen’s  victory over Lionel  Jospin in  the first  round of  the  2002 Presidential 
election – and, secondly, the role played in mainstream French political debates by questions 
related – whether in reality or in the popular imagination – to immigration. In short,  ‘the 
subject  of  immigration  and  the  citizenship  principle  of  jus  soli have  become  highly 
politicised’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 33). It is precisely the ‘long struggle of the French government 
to balance jus soli and jus sanguinis principles’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 34) which lies at the heart of 
questions of French citizenship and national belonging that means that the notion of filiation 
never seems to be far from the fore:
[C’]est parce que les fils d’immigrés se rendent compte qu’ils sont français, que leur avenir est 
dans la France et qu’ils n’ont pas d’autre patrie, que soudain ces problèmes d’identité prennent 
une telle tournure. (Dahomay, 2005)
Fassin  is  right,  then,  to  link  ongoing  debates  on  filiation  in  the  context  of  the  PACS 
legislation  to  broader  concerns  related  to  ‘the  French  nation  and  nationalité through 
citizenship’ (Fassin 2001: 225) and the search for a relevant response to the question ‘who is 
French, and who is not?’ (Fassin 2001: 232)
Some have viewed France as ‘a society where issues relating to […] sexual difference have 
been  persistently  obscured by  discourses  on  Republican  universalism  inherited  from the 
French revolution’ (Tarr and Rollet 2001: 5) [my emphasis]. However, such issues in fact 
interact with  these  discourses,  highlighting  discrepancies  between  republicanism  in  its 
‘inherited’ form, and a renewed, renegotiated form which would be more appropriate as an 
expression  of  the  values  of  contemporary  France.  This  is  not  to  deny  that,  in  some 
formulations, French republicanism and debates relating to sexuality and sexual difference are 
at odds. However, Fassin, for example, has described that it is possible for such debates to be 
expressed  in  terms  which  are  not  in  contradiction  with  the  universalism  of  French 
republicanism, precisely by ‘relying on the language of equality and discrimination (rather 
than of sexual difference)’ (Fassin 2001: 230).
Analysis  of  constructions  of  sexualities  does,  indeed,  involve  consideration  of  more 
traditional expressions of republicanism. However, it does so only insofar as these are shown 
to be in  need of  renewal  or,  at  the  very least,  a  degree  of  renegotiation,  and insofar  as 
traditional  expressions  of  republicanism,  as  Foerster  (2003:  10)  suggests,  are  themselves 
‘parasités [...] par une autre idéologie qui lui est antérieure et antithétique: la différence des 
sexes.’ Foerster’s interpretation brings into play the ‘ordre symbolique’ (Foerster 2003: 50), 
whichwas evoked, in turn, during debates on the PACS and the series of gender and family-
related issues it was seen to carry in its wake. It is by positioning of the family as a site of 
wider social crisis that the PACS engages with the over-arching question of a challenge to, or 
renegotiation of,  French republicanism in its  contemporary form.  In terms of sexuality  le  
citoyen is  perceived to  be  fractured,  highlighting the  need for  a  negotiatory discourse  to 
emerge which would allow  la République to rephrase its  republicanism in order for  it  to 
remain relevant to an evolving society. The debates on 1990s family structures, filiation, and 
what it is to be French, demonstrate that republicanism, as it is traditionally expressed, is not 
yet able to account for the difference which makes up the contemporary republic.
French republicanism, in its traditional formulations, is based on the fundamental notion of le  
citoyen as  an  abstract  individual  who enters  into a  direct  relationship with  the  State  not 
mediated through any aspects of sub-State-level identity.  In theory,  the resulting ideology, 
which lies at the heart of French identity, considers all citizens to be equal, precluding the 
possibility of discrimination on the basis of any ‘distinguishing feature’, such as, for instance, 
sexuality. In practice, however there is widespread debate on the relevance of this founding 
ideology in a social, political, and cultural climate very different to that of 1789. In other 
words, there is a social reality, played out in such domains as sexuality, which demands a 
renegotiation of republicanism in order for the ideology to remain of relevance to le citoyen.
The dialogue between the writings of  Martel,  Fassin,  and Foerster  illustrates the ways  in 
which constructions  of  a postqueer  citizen engage with the broader  political  debate.  This 
interaction points to the fragmented subjectivities which can be seen to emerge in members of 
minority communities as they attempt to reconcile difference with republican universalism. 
This debate is being actively pursued in contemporary France. Jacky Dahomay, for instance, 
offered an interesting analysis of ‘les paradoxes du républicanisme français’ (Dahomay 2005) 
and suggested that there is a key question which needs to be posed in order to work towards 
‘une nouvelle identité républicaine’ (Dahomay 2005):
Pourquoi ne pas se demander [...] ce qui, dans la tradition républicaine même, pose problème 
et qui empêche à (sic) des citoyens français de se sentir pleinement français? (Dahomay 2005)
Dahomay’s article engages explicitly with France’s post-colonial history, but the question he 
poses can be extended to other groups: they too find themselves physically located within 
metropolitan France, while simultaneously having denied to them a full sense of belonging to 
the republic on the basis of a particular aspect of their identity. Indeed, postqueer citizenship 
can be understood as offering a series of responses to Dahomay’s questions, suggesting ways 
in which it might be possible to envisage ‘une unité citoyenne française qui n’exclue [sic] pas 
la différence culturelle’ (Dahomay 2005).
The question of ‘cultural difference’ which is raised by Dahomay and many others lies at the 
heart of much contemporary debate on a reframing of French republicanism. When set against 
a French republican context, attempts to construct one’s identity in terms of sexual difference 
will  necessarily  be  in  opposition  to  the  abstract  universalism of  the  founding  republican 
ideology. As a result, we see emerging the model of fragmented citoyens who, in expressing 
their cultural difference, place themselves at odds with the traditional republican ideology.
La France, qu’elle le veuille ou non, est devenue profondément multiculturelle. Elle doit le 
prendre comme une richesse qui ne peut contredire l’universalisation de la vie publique. La 
France s’est créolisée, en quelque sorte, s’est métissée. (Dahomay 2005)
Again,  Dahomay’s  terms  emerge  from the  field  of  post-colonial  theory  but  they  can  be 
expanded to encompass  difference on a wider  scale,  including sexuality.  Since the  social 
reality of contemporary France is multicultural, or rather pluricultural, as such it is plurivocal, 
with individual citizens expressing difference in a series of key sites of identity construction. 
However, rather than positioning these citizens as the republic’s ‘other’, their expressions of 
difference can be equated with an attempt and a desire to renegotiate the terms of those forms 
of traditional French republicanism in a manner that challenges the existent binary between 
assimilated and ‘other’, in sexual, gendered, or ethnic terms.
Overall,  then,  what  emerges  here is  a vision of the individual  as a fragmented self.  This 
context is not to be understood in a ‘simply’ post-modern sense, but rather specifically as a 
reflection of,  response  to,  and engagement  with  ongoing debates  regarding  the  nature  of 
French  republicanism  in  a  contemporary  context.  The  postqueer  citizen  is  complexly 
fragmented  insofar  as  aspects  of  its  identities  express  particularities  which  cannot  be 
expressed within a traditional French republican framework, but rather must be assimilated in 
order to result in a universalisable citoyen, wiped of all traces of difference and thus equal to 
all others.
However, the notion of difference which the complex and fragmented self implies is primarily 
to  be  understood when set  in  contrast  to  the  republican model  offering  a  universalisable 
identity and, within this model, despite republicanist claims to the contrary, there exist what I 
would term identity equations. In other words, the  citoyen is not a blank canvas, but rather 
encompasses  a  series  of  normative  assumptions  about,  for  instance,  sexuality  which  are 
necessary in order to make sense of the very notion of cultural difference. What emerges from 
these different identities is, in fact, not an incoherent juxtaposition of individual and collective 
particularities, nor a communitarian model which seeks to supplant traditional republicanism. 
On the contrary,  these identities testify to a negotiatory discourse which, while seeking to 
highlight  the failings  of  republicanism to retain  relevance in  the  face of  changing social, 
political, and cultural realities, does so in order that republican definitions and values may be 
challenged and renegotiated so that its relevance be reclaimed.
Dahomay,  for  instance,  does  not  seek  an  alternative  to republicanism,  but  an  alternative 
within it,  asking  whether  ‘une  autre  politique  d’intégration  républicaine’  is  possible 
(Dahomay  2005),  while  French  sociologist  Michel  Wieviorka  (1996)  refers  to  ‘une 
République qui parle d’égalité et de fraternité’ but which fails to live up to its own promises. 
And this brings us back to Foerster and his assertion that republicanism holds within it the 
potential for ‘le régime politique le plus queer qui puisse exister’ (Foerster 2003: 10) and a 
‘Marianne travaillée de l’intérieur’ (Foerster 2003: 94). While this usage of ‘queer’ may still 
be problematic within standard French and Foerster’s imagery may be a little too radical for 
some, its reflection can be found in more mainstream political, critical and media discourse. 
His vision of Marianne as representing a republic challenged from within echoes Deleuze and 
Guattari’s discussion of challenge emanating ‘du dedans’ and Judith Butler’s comments, in 
relation to representations of gendered identities, that ‘a new configuration of politics would 
surely  emerge  from  the  old’  (Butler  [1990]  1999:  112).  More  recently,  Dahomay  has 
suggested that a solution to the problem of republican integration can be found only if:
Nous  tentons  de  comprendre  les  paradoxes  du  républicanisme  français  et  la  nature  des 
antinomies qui le travaillent. (Dahomay 2005)
Only then will the fragmented postqueer self find coherence and unity within and through 
difference. French republicanism, as traditionally understood, is thus invited to consider its 
ambivalences and paradoxes, to recognise the contemporary period as one of ‘transition rather 
than transformation’ (Bhabha 2005) and to strive for a negotiatory discourse which seeks to 
posit  intersections  of  discursively  constructed  and  performed  identities  as  a  positive 
engagement with contemporary republicanism.
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